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Abstract 
 
This dissertation aims to deconstruct the term of stress tests by focusing on the methodology 
and framework used in the EU from 2009 to 2014. It traces the evolution of these exercises and 
records the reaction of the market participants, as indicated by relevant papers, surveys and 
articles in the financial press.  
In order to assess the impact of the latest EU-wide stress test, I conducted an event study 
analysis on the stocks of the banks included in the 2014 exercise and the next 14 biggest 
institutions in terms of capitalization. I divided my sample into 4 groups, Stressed, Not-Stressed, 
PIGS and Failed and I found significant market reactions in all of the three events, I used in my 
research, the announcement of the test, the announcement of the methodology and the 
disclosure of results.  
I conclude that investors perceive value in stress testing and revise their estimations based on 
this unprecedented amount of data regarding to the opaque banking industry. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The global financial crisis of 2007-2008 sparked by the collapse of Lehman Brothers, a global 
financial services firm, in 2008, brought the world economy into its knees. What started as a 
financial crisis soon evolved into a social crisis that led people to poverty and exclusion. As 
reported by the European Commission at least 20 million people are affected in Europe alone. 
The crisis changed the way people lived, spent their money and of course invest.  
Technology, financial globalization and deregulated markets created a culture of risk tolerance.   
Risk avert investors were lured by the euphoria of the markets and stopped judging rationally, 
instead looked for high returns through innovative unregulated financial instruments. The 
reality of the global financial crisis hit investors hard as they recorded huge loses. The financial 
turmoil did not discriminate between investors, professional or not. The response of the 
investors was to avoid anything that involved any kind of risk further magnifying the 
consequences of the crisis. 
Investors relied on the policy makers not only to deal with the imminent threat but also to take 
proactive measures to prevent another crisis. In the U.S., government designed a number of 
monetary stimulus packages to increase confidence and avert further bankruptcies along with 
nationalization efforts.  On the other side of the Atlantic, European governments attempted to 
rescue banks from failing with a very high cost that almost led them to bankruptcy (e.g. 
government of Ireland). Inevitably, the global financial crisis evolved into a euro crisis. 
European financial institutions were proven vulnerable and that forced the European Union 
(EU) to take supervisory measures. 
This thesis focuses on the actions taken by the EU through its authorities and specifically the 
stress test exercises that were carried in 4 stages (2009, 2010, 2011 and 2014). These tests aim 
to assess banks resilience to possible future shocks through their need for additional capital. 
Assumptions made in a baseline and an adverse scenario help investors judge for themselves if 
a bank is well capitalized and functions properly, supporting the European economy while 
recovering. (European Banking Authority, 2014). In October 2014 the European Banking 
Authority (EBA) announced the results of the 2014 EU wide stress test of 123 banks and the 
question that rises is whether those figures provide the information much needed by investors. 
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As stress test offer an unprecedented amount of data for such an opaque industry, investors 
can be greatly benefited by managing the risk they retain and not depend on outsider help as 
credit agencies.   
The aim of this research is to provide investors with a deeper understanding of the mechanism 
behind EBA stress tests that will allow them to interpret the results of those exercises as a part 
of their risk management. Additionally it examines whether disclosed information was of 
interest to the investors and subsequently incorporated into stock prices by conducting an 
event study analysis of stock prices of European banks during the last year. 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 offers a literature review on relevant to 
stress test topics while Chapter 3 examines the factors that led to the depression and the need 
to strengthen supervision, which is based on the framework presented in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 
attempts an overview on the key elements of the stress test including the results of the 2014 
exercise that are examined through the methodology used in this thesis, an event study 
analysis of Chapter 6. Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation. 
 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
The global financial crisis has been a subject of numerous papers given its impact worldwide. 
Payne (2012) offers a categorization of the factors that combined led to the global recession as 
deregulated markets, innovative financial instruments, and executive compensation. Profit-
based rewards incentivized executives into excessive risk taking as indicated in KPMG’s (2009) 
global survey among 500 senior managers where remuneration policies take the first place in 
the table of factors contributing to the crisis.   
Another factor that led to the crisis is banking industry opaqueness. Investors can use 
supervisors’ stress tests to minimize the effects of a bank being opaque. Several studies 
examine the role of the bank regulators and as Prescott (2008) describes in his paper, bank 
regulators collect information as data about balance sheet, operations and management in the 
process of ensuring a safe and sound banking system based on their legal and regulatory 
powers unavailable to investors. In addition, Peristian et al. (2010), in their report of the 
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information value of the stress test and bank opacity, suggest that banks are opaque even in 
ordinary times and conclude that horizontal government examinations can help make banks be 
more transparent. Morgan et al. (2013) conclude that while investors were informed of the 
capital deficiencies of banks, they were surprised by their actual size and were forced to revise 
their estimations. Peristian et al. (2010) connect opaqueness to the panic of the financial 
markets in 2008. 
The tools used by supervisors were built on a common framework. Basel Committee through its 
accords offers a common set of standards for bank regulation. Balin (2008) divide the first 
accord, Basel I, into four pillars: the constituents of capital, risk weighting, target standard ratio 
of capital and transitional and implementing agreements. Basel Committee introduced a 
second accord in order to adjust to the ever changing financial environment and received 
critique on several issues as on its method of risk measure (Keiding H., 2013).The last accord, 
even if improved it was criticized too (Salmon F., 2010, Moosa I. et al., 2013). 
This thesis focus on a specific tool used by supervisors, stress tests. Ong and Pazarbasioglu 
(2013) in the IMF working paper that examines credibility and crisis stress testing argue that 
stress testing remains an art rather than a science and point out the importance of an expert 
judgment. On the other hand, Bank for International Settlements (2012) identifies stress testing 
as a method to assess adverse outcomes of risks. Borio et al. (2012) divide stress tests into 
micro tests for individual portfolios or institutions and macro tests for groups. Henry and Kok 
(2013) further divide stress tests in bottom-up and top-down tests depending on the level they 
are carried out (central or bank-to-bank). Regardless of their model, all stress tests share 4 key 
elements: a set of risk exposures, a scenario that describes the possible shocks, a model and 
the outcome that captures the final impact of shocks (Borio et al., 2012). EBA (2014) describes 
EU‐wide stress test as a method to assess the resilience of banks in the EU by the supervisors. 
In the light of the euro zone crisis, the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) first 
and EBA later, conducted a series of stress tests in a sample of European banks. Several studies 
examined their effect of the financial markets and found evidence of significant market 
reactions as Petrella and Resti (2013) and Alves et al. (2013). On the other hand there are 
papers that doubt the influence of stress tests on the market as the works of Ellahie (2012) and 
Shuermann (2012). 
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As the results of the latest exercise were announced in October 2014, there are limited 
literature assessing the impact of the disclosure of results on stock prices of banks included in 
the stress test. This thesis uses an event study methodology. There is extended literature 
concerning the event studies as by Fama et al. (1969) , Brown and Warner (1985), Boehmer et 
al. (1991) and Prabhala (1997), while this analysis is split in seven steps as outlined by Campbell 
et al. (1997). 
 
2.1 Summary 
Investors have to make decisions in an environment of uncertainty and volatility. In the 
aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 bank regulators are testing the resilience of 
the banking industry, a fact that presents investors with an opportunity to access information 
that will allow them to examine the once opaque banks. Build using the standards of Basel 
Accords, stress tests assess the quality of banks capital and aim to restore confidence. It is 
important to examine how this effort is valued by the market participants in general and stock 
markets specifically. 
 
Chapter 3: Methodology  
This chapter presents the combination of methodologies that were applied.  
3.1 Qualitative Research 
One of the goals of this thesis is to offer investors with a deeper understanding of the 
foundations of the supervisory efforts in Europe. In order to accomplish that, I have conducted 
a literature based research on relevant topics as bank opaqueness, global financial crisis, stress 
tests and event studies. During this research I used electronic databases as Business Source 
Complete (powered by EBSCO) and JSTOR. Additionally, I visited ScienceDirect.com to access 
articles and books of interest to this subject.  
Regarding to the information presented in chapter 4, where findings are presented, I have 
studied the reports and papers published by organizations as European Banking Authority, 
European Central Bank, Bank for International Settlements, International Monetary Fund, The 
World Bank and European Commission through their websites. Furthermore, in attempt to 
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present the reaction of the market participants, I have studied articles published by the 
financial press. 
This method allowed a quick and efficient research but it comes with certain constraints. First 
of all the overwhelming amount of available data on the web requires filtering and bears the 
threat of overlooking valuable evidence or papers, undermining the quality of the analysis and 
the results. Furthermore papers, articles and books offer great detail in capturing the past but 
cannot illustrate present. I have used past papers and authorities’ reports to present the 
regulation in banks in Europe which is currently a field of great volatility and changes rapidly. 
   
3.2 Quantitative Research 
In an attempt to strengthen my empirical research I have also used a quantitative method. In 
order to test the hypothesis of whether stress test have an impact on the market I analyzed 
markets’ performance with and without those exercises. To accomplish that, this thesis follows 
a statistical approach, an event study methodology.  
Campbell et al. (1997) suggest that there is way to measure the effect an event has on a firm by 
observing financial market data. They claim that if a market is rational, then the effects of an 
event are reflected immediately on the asset prices. In this case stock prices for listed banking 
institutions are observed in a time period of a year in order to record any deviations from a 
normal (no stress test) performance. 
The event study is structured as proposed by Campbell et al. (1997). 
 
3.2.1 Event Definition 
For the purpose of this analysis, this dissertation focuses on three events that are part of the 
2014 exercise and might have affected the stock prices of the banks involved: 
 The announcement of the EBA exercise on Friday 31.01.2014 
 The publication of scenarios and methodology on Tuesday 29.04.2014 
 The publication of results on Sunday 26.10.2014 
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All of three events were one day events, although in order to capture the effects of news 
leakages and lagged reactions, I used a three-day window as illustrated in other papers 
examining stress tests using event study as by Peristian et al. (2010) and Neretina et al. (2014). 
The event window includes trading days before and after the trading day of each event. 
3.2.2 Selection Criteria 
EBA exercise stressed 123 European banks of public and private form. The event study sample 
includes the 58 public institutions and specifically their stock prices as listed in stock exchange 
markets of countries included in the EBA stress test along with the next 14 biggest banks in 
terms of capitalization. Banks are divided in four groups:  
 The stressed group of 58 banks that were included in the exercise 
 The not-stressed group of the next 14 biggest banks in Europe 
 PIGS group that consists of 23 stressed banks from Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain 
 Failed group that includes the banks that did not meet the capital threshold criteria 
 
3.2.3 Normal and Abnormal Returns 
Stock prices are collected over a period of time, therefore they could either fluctuate around a 
well-defined mean and constant finite variance (stationery time series) or not (non-stationery 
time series) (Burke, 2010). In order to minimize the serious consequences of non-stationarity 
on the results of this study, the rate of return of stocks is calculated using the logarithmic 
formula: 
                                                              (1) 
Where  stands for the logarithmic return of bank i at the time t,  is the current closing 
price and is last day’s closing price. 
To examine the impact of the event on the stock prices’ movement we need to define normal 
and abnormal return. 
The market model as described by Campbell et al. (1997) assumes a stable linear relation 
between the market return and the security return. Thus, following related literature (as with 
the example of Peristian et al. (2010) and Alves et al. (2013)), I estimated a market model by 
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regressing the daily stock return for each individual bank,  , on market return  , proxied 
by the return on the Stoxx Europe TMI Banks financial index: 
 
                                                             (2) 
Where parameters  and  are estimated separately for each financial institution. 
Since I have calculated the normal return, I can define the abnormal return as the residual 
between the observed and predicted return. 
                                                            (3) 
Where and are the abnormal and the normal return, respectively, for time period t.  
is the conditioning information for the normal model. 
In order to cancel out the effects of unrelated information, I averaged the firm’s return data. 
This way unrelated information should cancel out as abnormal returns center around the 
particular event (De Jong et al., 1991). The unweighted cross-sectional average of abnormal 
returns in period t is: 
 
                                                           (4) 
 
3.2.4 Estimation Procedure 
The estimation begins by calculating the parameters   and  separately for each financial 
institution in a predefined estimation window. Literature offer examples of different lengths as 
Campbell et al. (1997) and Alves et al. (2013) propose 120 days prior to the event in case of 
daily data while Peristian et al. (2010) use a year of daily data. This study used an estimation 
window of a year prior to each event and the method of ordinary least squares. Excluding 
estimation window from the event period ensures that  and  are not affected by the 
events. 
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3.2.5 Testing Procedure 
In order to test whether abnormal returns are not a result of chance and thus significantly 
different from zero, I conducted a hypothesis testing. 
 
The null hypothesis suggests that there are no abnormal returns in the event window: 
 
H0:E(AARt)=0                                                                      (5) 
 
While the alternative hypothesis suggests the presence of abnormal returns in the event 
window: 
 
H1:E(AARt)≠0                                                                     (6) 
I tested the null hypothesis of no abnormal returns using a simple t-test that was based on the 
following assumptions: 
Abnormal Returns  
 are independently and identically distributed 
 follow a normal distribution with mean zero and variance σ2 
To find σ2, I estimate σ from the cross-sectional variance of the abnormal returns in period t: 
                                               (7) 
The test statistic for the average abnormal return is: 
                                                            (8) 
The test statistic follows a student-t distribution with N-1 degrees of freedom. As a result of the 
central limit theorem (de Jong, 2007) G follows a standard normal distribution in large samples. 
As this sample includes data of stock prices over a year and since I assumed that ARit are 
independent with the same variance and mean we have: 
                                                       (9) 
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Since I am studying a long period surrounding the event, I calculate the cumulative abnormal 
returns. The cumulative average abnormal return is calculated as follows: 
                            (10) 
The cumulative average abnormal return, , is given by: 
                                           (11) 
The null hypothesis is: 
                                                          (12) 
Against the two-sided alternative hypothesis: 
                                                          (13) 
 
And variance of the cumulative average abnormal return is calculated as follows: 
                         (14) 
The null hypothesis is tested using the t-statistic  obtained from: 
                                                   (15) 
 
3.2.6 Key constraints 
Event study as a method comes with its own constraints. First there is the issue of the 
assumption of a perfect market. There might be a delay in the way stock prices reflect an event 
and additionally other external to the analysis events may also affect the returns in question. 
Another problematic area is the estimation period, as a falsely defined period will affect the 
results.  
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Chapter 4: Findings 
This section presents the findings of the research divided in sections according to the respective 
methodology. 
4.1 Literature based research 
4.1.1 Basel Committee 
The breakdown of the Bretton Woods system of managed exchange rates in 1973 triggered a 
financial market turmoil that resulted in large foreign currency losses. One of the banks that 
suffered, the German bank Bankhaus Herstatt, had its license withdrew due to its excessive 
foreign exchange exposure. Herstatt had unsettled transactions with banks outside Germany, a 
fact that gave an international dimension to the crisis. The central bank governors of the G10 
identified the need for improved supervision and established a committee to set global 
standards for bank regulation and supervision. This forum that had its first meeting in 1975, it 
was later renamed into Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. 
 
4.1.2 Basel I 
The Basel Committee, driven by the onset of the Latin America debt crisis, approved a capital 
measurement system, the Basel Capital Accord and introduced it to countries with active 
international banks in 1988. 
Basel Accord divides itself into four “pillars” (Balin 2008): 
1. The Constituents of Capital, defines both what types of on-hand capital are counted as a 
bank’s reserves and how much of each type of reserve capital a bank can hold. Capital reserves 
are divided into two tiers: 
 Tier 1 Capital or core capital consists of equity, disclosed reserves, retained earnings, 
less goodwill and other deductions 
 Tier 2 or supplementary capital can include loan loss allowances, undisclosed reserves 
and holdings of subordinated debt  
According to Basel I, Tier 1 and Tier 2 must be equal. 
2. Risk Weighting, divides a bank’s assets into 5 risk categories 
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Table 1 Basel I Risk Categories 
Risk Weight Asset 
0% Riskless cash, bonds, all OECD debt 
20% Low bonds issued by agencies of OECD governments, local governments and 
insured mortgages 
50% Moderate uninsured residential mortgages 
100% High all corporate loans and claims by non-OECD banks or government debts, 
equity and property 
0,10,20,50% (*) claims on domestic public sector entities  
*valued on central bank’s discretion 
Source: Balin (2008) 
3. A Target Standard Ratio of capital to weighted risk assets set to 8%. Tier 1 capital element 
will be at least 4% as a minimum standard that allowed for a transitional period during which 
international banks will take any necessary actions to build up to target levels. 
4. Transitional and Implementing Agreements, sets the stage for the implementation of the 
Basel Accords. Banks had a four year period to achieve the accord’s standards under central 
bank surveillance. 
Basel Accord was accused of following a simplistic approach to address the complex banking 
activities. Its first pillar of Capital Constituents did not take into account differences from 
country to country in ways of measuring capital severely affecting the determination of Tier 1 
and Tier 2 capital. In its second pillar of Risk Weighting, weights were a result of negotiations 
and did not derive from an insolvency probability standard. Additionally to arbitrary weights are 
divided in only four levels that cannot fully depict the quality of assets included.  
Those shortcomings allowed banking institutions to reduce capital requirements without 
reducing their risk exposure. Basel Accord incentivized banks to arbitrage by avoiding assets 
that bear higher capital requirements than market requires and buy assets that require lower 
regulatory capital requirements than market. 
The Basel Committee introduced an amendment in 1996 to incorporate market risk. The 
amendment added a third tier, Tier 3, capital that included short-timed subordinated debt of 
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less than 2 years maturity (under a number of requirements) accompanied by an internal model 
to compute capital requirements for market risk.   
 
4.1.3 Basel II  
The Basel Accord evolved in order to offer a more risk-sensitive framework thus a Basel II was 
introduced in 2004 and was structured on three pillars: 
1. Minimal Capital Requirements sets the rules by which banks calculate capital risk ratios and 
central banks assess minimum capital threshold. New rules cover credit, market and 
operational risk while capital requirements remain as in Basel I. 
 
2. Supervisory Oversight ensures that banks maintain capital requirements. It also promotes an 
open dialogue between supervisors and bankers in the process of the reviewing of banks’ 
internal assessment methodology. Banks are encouraged to go beyond minimum requirements 
and hold additional capital as a sign of effective management. 
3. Market Discipline in the form of disclosure of key information complements the previous 
two pillars. Banks should disclose their risk exposure, capital adequacy and all other 
information that will allow market participants to assess a banks.  Banks should report every 6 
months and even more often in case of a global presence. 
Basel II was introduced to counteract on first accord’s shortcomings but itself was criticized on 
a number of issues. Literature indicates that the internal ratings approach for the computation 
of minimum capital requirements based on Value at Risk (VaR) assumes that one banks actions 
based on its forecasts on future market volatility does not affect market volatility. Keiding H. 
(2013) argues that this is not the case. It is not like a weather forecast, where actions taken 
based on it, do not affect the forecast itself. Additionally the accord relies on credit ratings that 
come with their pathogenies. Credit ratings are usually not consistent across credit agencies 
and they are based on accounting data that follow market developments slowly. Finally, 
riskiness of assets vary over the business cycle that allows banks to fluctuate their exposure to 
risk accordingly. 
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4.1.4 Basel III 
The global financial crisis forced Basel Committee to revise its capital adequacy guidelines. It is 
important to examine the factors that combined led to the biggest crisis since the Great 
Depression of 1930s.  
Several studies place the birth of the crisis in USA and during the time period that succeeded 
the collapse of Lehman Brothers, a global bank, on September 15 2008.  
 
Figure 1 Financial Turmoil in 2008 
Source: The New York Times 
 
Payne (2012) offers a categorization of the factors that led to the financial crisis: 
 The financial regulations that were imposed to the US market as a response to the Great 
Depression became outdated. The highly volatile market that was structured around the 
unlinked to gold dollar, new technologies and changes in the society led to the Deregulation 
of Financial Markets. Investors sought to take complete control over their funds and 
investments in the stock market, a fact that led to the removal of numerous regulations. 
That combined with the efforts of financial institutions to adopt a global outlook forced the 
global economy into an era of global financial liberalization were no one would doubt the 
wisdom of the markets. 
 Technological advancement gave financial transactions speed and low cost. Financial experts 
received the aid of computer experts in creating new innovative financial instruments to 
help them achieve higher returns. Examples of Financial Innovation are securitization, hedge 
funds and credit default swaps.  
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In securitization, certain types of assets are bundled into interest-bearing securities. The 
purchasers receive interest and principal payments. The mechanism behind securitization is 
demonstrated in the following diagram. 
 
Figure 2. How securitization works 
 
Source: Jobst (2008) 
An example of securitization are Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS) that allow banks to loan 
to subprime borrowers and then mitigate risk to the purchasers of the MBS that pools those 
mortgages. 
Hedge funds are portfolios that use hedge techniques to minimize risk and maximize return. 
As hedge funds are open for wealthy investors only, they are considered sophisticated tools 
and thus remain unregulated.  
Another unregulated financial instrument is Credit Default Swaps (CDS) that transfers credit 
risk away from lender. The seller of the CDS agrees to compensate the buyer in the case of a 
predefined credit event for an exchange of a series of payments by the buyer. 
 Another factor of the crisis is Executive Compensation. A survey by KPMG in 2009 revealed 
that 52% of the senior managers in large financial institutions identify incentives and 
remuneration as the key factor that contributed to the credit crisis. Banks CEO’s payment 
arrangements incentivized excessive risk taking as their remuneration was linked to short 
term profit increase.     
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 The global financial system had to deal with high levels of liquidity and Low Interest Rates 
due to a money surplus. The U.S. Federal Reserve followed by the European Central Bank 
and Bank of Japan reduced interest rates encouraging increased government and consumer 
spending. Additionally, rises of oil prices triggered excessive surpluses in reserves of 
emerging economies. That level of money could not be spent rationally. 
 Financial Times (n.d.) define Speculation as an investment strategy that takes high risk 
aiming at quick, substantial gains from financial transactions. Speculators attempt to profit 
from market fluctuations and usually ignore the fundamental value of a stock or a company. 
The money surplus and the technological advancement created a global euphoria of ever-
lasting prosperity. That level of overconfidence lured even cautious investors in excessive 
risk taking creating a speculative bubbles as the real estate bubble in the U.S.    
 
The Lehmann brothers collapse terrorized banking industry and stopped the U.S. interbank 
lending market. Financial institutions that relied heavily on such loans turned to government 
that offered through the U.S. Secretary of Treasury $700 billion in a form of distressed assets 
purchases or cash. The bailout program did not prevent the recession of global stock markets 
worldwide. On the other side of the Atlantic, European banks had invested heavily in the 
American mortgage market and were hit hard. Governments attempted to rescue banks from 
failing with a very high cost that almost led them to bankruptcy (e.g. Ireland). Inevitably, the 
global financial crisis evolved into a euro crisis. 
Financial institutions are in the epicenter of the global financial crisis and the ongoing financial 
turmoil. Specifically observers link financial panic of 2008 to bank opacity (Peristian et al. 2010). 
Deregulation and financial innovation increased banks size and complexity making it impossible 
for outsiders (e.g. investors) and even insiders to judge a banks solvency, the degree to which 
current assets exceed current liabilities. Investors lost their confidence into financial industry 
and inevitably panicked at the height of the financial crisis. The uncertainty was so severe that 
even banks did not trust each other as depicted in the excessive interbank lending rates of 
2008. 
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In November 2010, the core principles of a framework were set under the term Basel III. Bank 
for International Settlements (BIS) defines Basel III as set of reform measures, to strengthen the 
regulation, supervision and risk management of the banking sector. 
Basel III proposes the following: 
 An increase of quality and quantity of capital by adding two new items to the existing 
system. A Capital buffer in the case of a sudden increase in bank’s activities and a 
countercyclical buffer to prevent cyclical fluctuations of capital.  
 Backstop leverage ratio to reduce the risk of excessive leverage in the institution and in 
the system as a whole. Total assets should not be more than 1/3 of bank’s capital. 
 Increased short term liquidity by introducing the 30-day Liquidity Coverage Ratio  (LCR) 
that increases resilience against liquidity disruptions 
 Increased long-term balance sheet funding monitored by the Net Stable Funding Ratio 
(NSFR) promoting stable funding sources against short-term funding.  
 Strengthed risk capture to achieve full coverage of pillar 1 risks.  
 
Basel III may lead to reduced competition, as it erects entry barriers (The Economist, 2010). 
Higher capital requirements and the introduction of LCR will decrease profits and banks will be 
in need of equity investors that are currently looking to reduce their holdings in the financial 
sector. Additionally, according to Salmon F. (2010) Basel III assumes that securities that were 
risky in the past will be also risky in the future. Moosa I. et al. (2013) in their assessment of 
Basel III argue that flawed components of Basel II have been carried forward as internal models 
of calculating regulatory capital, reliance on rating agencies and implementation issues.  
The depression unveiled the vulnerability of the banking sector in both U.S. and Europe that 
forced authorities to strengthen financial sector supervision to ensure that banks are better 
capitalized and behave responsibly by introducing stress tests. EBA is responsible for the 
implementation of Basel III and to conduct stress tests in EU. 
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4.1.5 European Banking Authority  
EBA is an independent authority that supervises the European banking sector. EBA took over 
tasks and responsibilities of the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) in January 
2011. One main task of EBA is contributing to the creation of the European Single Rulebook, a 
single set of harmonized prudential rules for financial institutions in the European Union (EBA, 
2015). The European Single Rulebook aims to provide depositors, investors and consumers with 
a level playing field and high protection. 
In addition to the European Single Rulebook, another responsibility of EBA is Basel III 
agreement and its implementation in Europe. Since Basel III is not a law, it must be transposed 
into EU legislation. This act, called Capital requirements regulation and directive (CRR/CRD IV) 
contains a regulation with detailed requirements for credit institutions and investment firms 
and a directive that covers areas of capital requirements. 
 
4.1.6 Stress Testing 
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, European Union has included stress testing as a 
tool for its regular risk assessment of the financial system in an attempt to examine the 
system’s resilience to possible shocks. 
Stress testing as a tool has its origin at engineering, where it was used to determine the 
resilience of a system of an entity. In finance, as Borio et al. (2012) describe, stress testing can 
be used to test individual portfolios or institutions (micro stress testing) or test groups of 
institutions (macro stress testing) that affect the financial system as a whole. Henry and Kok 
(2013) further divide stress tests in bottom-up stress tests carried out at the level of the banks, 
and top-down stress tests carried out at a centralized level without involving the banks being 
stressed.  
Both macro and micro stress tests share four elements (Borio et al. 2012). The first element is 
the set of risk exposures that in the case of banking system represent the core of the analysis 
due to their size. Stress tests also have a scenario that describes the possible shocks. Scenarios 
should be realistic but also severe, as a weak scenario undermines the quality of the results. 
Third element is the model of the test based on which tests are divided in bottom-up, top-down 
or a combination of the two. The model as a process produces estimates of the impact of the 
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scenario. The final element is a measure of the outcome that captures the final impact of 
shocks in terms of portfolio or capital losses. The following schematic offers a graphic 
representation on the structure as described above: 
 
Figure 3 Stress Test structure 
  
Source: Borio et al. 2012 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013) working paper on liquidity stress testing 
offers examples of supervisory practices. Bank of Italy, the China Banking Regulatory 
Commission (CBRC) and the European Banking Authority (EBA) have used bottom up macro 
stress tests while tests designed by the Central Bank of the Republic of Austria, Bank of 
England, Bank of Canada and Netherlands Bank are cases of top down models.  
Stress tests do not come without limitations. Borio et al. (2012) warn about the use of stress 
tests as early warning devices based on the existence of two set of limitations. First stress test 
models need to evolve further in order to fully capture the non-linear nature of financial 
distress. Furthermore they refer to the context of the stress test as measures of systemic risk 
used in stress exercises that rely on market data that indicate signs of trouble only after a crisis 
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emerges. Further limitations are presented in the following chapter using the case studies of EU 
stress testing mechanism. 
 
4.1.7 EU wide stress test 2009 
The first EU wide stress test was announced in May 2009 by the Committee of European 
Banking Supervisors (CEBS) in a brief announcement that only revealed the intentions behind 
the exercise. The first stress test was based on scenarios and guidelines provided by the CEBS 
and aimed to provide information for policy makers and authorities based on aggregated data 
of 22 major European cross border banks. The outcomes were not revealed to public. 
In October CEBS released a report of the results that indicated that the financial position and 
expected results of banks are sufficient to maintain an adequate level of capital also under such 
negative circumstances (CEBS, 2009). Using Basel minimum capital requirement of 4% as 
benchmark, banks’ aggregate Tier 1 ratios remained over 9% under a baseline scenario and 
above 8% under the adverse scenario. 
Since there is a shortage of available data, this stress tests is presented in order to better 
illustrate the evolution of European stress tests by comparison to later exercises. It is also 
useful to mention that results were criticized. Among others, Economist (2014) reports that 
European regulators failed to restore confidence using stress tests in contrast to the ones 
performed in the U.S. as results were contradicted by bank failures. Noonan et al. (2013) in 
their article on Reuters describe EU tests as series of half-hearted assessments.   
 
4.1.8 EU wide stress test 2010 
CEBS carried an extended stress test exercise in 2010. The sample of banks chosen represented 
65% of the EU banking sector and at least 50% of the national banking sector. Groups were 
examined as a whole, in the total of 91 banks of the sample. The objective of the second 
exercise was to assess the resilience of the European banking sector against possible future 
shocks and the banks dependence on government support.  
CEBS focused on credit and markets risk factors in order to design the shocks applied. The test 
includes the effects of the global financial crisis on global demand and country specific 
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fluctuations to the yield curve in the context of a global confidence shock. CEBS in cooperation 
with the European Central Bank (ECB) and EU Commission developed a baseline and an adverse 
scenario for simulation purposes. 
The baseline scenario describes a mild recovery in terms of GDP, unemployment and interest 
rates while the adverse scenario assumes a short-lived recovery followed by a new recession. 
Both scenarios that cover a 2 year horizon are based on an assumption of stable exposure to 
market and credit risks. This exercise was constructed using a bottom-up model and applied the 
two commonly agreed macro-economic scenarios to every institution’s internal risk parameters 
and portfolios.  
CEBS announced the results in July 2010, finding 7 banks that failed to meet the exercise 
threshold of Tier 1 capital ratios of 6% under the adverse scenario. Those were Hypo Real 
Estate, ATE Bank of Greece, Diada, Espiga, Banca Civica, Unnim and CajaSur. 
The market reacted with skepticism as evident in the numerous articles and studies that 
followed the announcement of the results. Financial press reports a climate of disbelief as 
market participants believed that regulators designed a mild exercise that banks would pass 
easily, (Economist online, Financial Times, 2010). An opinion supported by the low percentage 
of failed banks (7.7%). Analysts and market participants expressed their fears of the stress tests 
insufficiency and their confidence that interbank market would answer the question of EU 
financial system’s soundness (Peston R., 2010). 
Ellahie (2012) and Shuermann (2012) in their papers on stress tests conclude that the disclosure 
of results of the 2010 exercise did not had a significant effect on market. On the contrary Alves 
et al. (2013) suggest that there was a significant influence of the stress test result on the stock 
prices of the banks that were included in the exercise. They detect a decreased volatility of the 
stocks that they barely passed the test. Despite the difference in results, all papers above 
emphasize the role of stress tests in improving the information environment by disclosing 
unique financial data to market participants (e.g. regulators and investors) given the opaque 
nature of the banking sector. 
 
 21 
 
 
4.1.9 EU wide stress test 2011 
EBA, established in January 2011, has undertaken the responsibility of conducting stress tests 
by CEBS. This third exercise was a part of the framework established by the European System of 
Financial Supervision (ESFS) and required the coordination of national supervisors, the 
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), ECB and the European Commission. The resilience of the 
financial system was again at the epicenter of the new stress test organized for the first half of 
2011.  
EBA attempted to build on the experience of the previous two tests. Similar rules were used at 
the construction of the sample, thus 90 banks were included in terms of consolidated assets as 
of end of 2010. The selected institutions were stressed under the bottom-up model and two 
scenarios. 
The baseline scenario predicted a self-sustained recovery that in comparison to the previous 
exercise, was built on improved conditions as real growth ratios were better than the 
predictions used in the 2010 baseline scenario. Along with a GDP growth, interest rates are 
expected to increase while unemployment and public deficits are expected to slowly decrease 
indicating a softening global environment.  
The adverse scenario that covers the horizon of 2011-2012 has made some key assumptions. 
First of all, that there would be an increase of the sovereign debt crisis especially for the euro 
area accompanied by a negative sentiment shock that will cause stock prices to drop 
significantly and short-term interbank rates to rise. The increased uncertainty would lead to 
higher unemployment, unexpected private area loses and worse credit environment. Finally 
houses would take additional pressure along with consumption and investment. 
The table below summarizes the difference between scenarios of 2011 and 2010 exercises in 
terms of GDP and unemployment. 
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Table 2 Stress Test Scenarios 
 
Notes: GDP changes realized is real GDP growth rate 
Source: Eurostat for realized figures, stress test scenarios 
 
The results, published in July 2011, revealed that, at the end of 2010, 20 banks failed the 
threshold of 5% Core Tier 1 Ratio (CT1R) over the two years horizon of the exercise 
accumulating a shortfall of EUR 26.8bn. EBA notes that if capital raising actions undertaken by 
banks in 2011 are inserted into the model then the number of failed institutions drops to 8 and 
16 of the rest pass by a small margin.  
The reaction of the analysts were similar to the one in 2010 as they did not find a significant 
improvement of the stress test methodology and questioned the significance of the results. A 
key flaw that was pointed out in their interviews was the faulty assumption of a 25% haircut of 
the Greek government debt in contrast to a market’s valuation of 50% (Economist, Bloomberg, 
2011). Numerous papers examined the impact of the results on the markets. Petrella and Resti 
(2013) find evidence of significant market reactions. They results of their analysis indicate that 
market participants did not have the information disclosed by EBA. Alves et al. (2013) support 
the case of Petrella et al. as they record increased volatility of stocks that failed the test right 
after the results announcement.  
 
4.1.10 EU wide stress test 2014 
Stress tests became a useful tool for authorities and investors in the difficult task of assessing 
banking sector resilience in stressful situations. Market reactions on the precious exercises 
indicated that market developed an increased interest on stress tests’ results as they became 
harder and disclosed an unprecedented amount of data regarding to the opaque financial 
institutions. The fourth round of stress tests did not come until January 2014. After 2 years 
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without stress tests EBA disclosed the methodology in use which main features coincided with 
the ECB comprehensive assessment of 130 banks. ECB assessment was a part of the 
preparations for the establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism in November 2014. 
EBA attempted to respond to the critique of the 2011 exercise and introduced some 
improvements in its new test (EBA 2014): 
 Banks were given less room in their calculations of defined caps and floors and 
prescribed fixed stress impacts for various risk types. The new methodology attempted 
to make the new exercise harder than the previous. 
 In order to enhance the validity and comparability of the data used, EBA linked it to an 
Asset Quality Review (AQR). ECB describes AQR as a health check that tests the accuracy 
of the value that banks’ assets carried as of 31.12.2013 as they were used as a starting 
point for the stress test. 
 Competent authorities reviewed both data inserted in the model as well as outcome in 
order to ensure the quality, validity and credibility. They assessed data as estimations, 
results and qualitative information provided by banks. 
 Scenarios of 2014 cover a horizon of 3 years compared to a 2 year period covered by the 
previous test. 
 Due to the implementation of CRR/CRD IV, Common Equity Tier 1 ratio was increased by 
50 base points to 5.5% (adverse scenario).  
 
In order to create the sample of banks EBA followed similar rules to the previous years. 
Although, the new sample is wider as it includes 123 banks from 22 countries. EBA chose those 
institutions to represent more than 70% of the EU banking assets or 28 trillion euros. EBA was 
responsible for developing the methodology, templates used in data harvesting and the 
disclosure of the results assisted by ESRB and the European Commission that constructed the 
two scenarios in use. Additionally the competent authorities were in charge of AQR, the quality 
control of the data and decided the follow up actions. 
As with previous exercises, banks resilience was tested under two scenarios that cover the 
period of 2014-2016 and required banks to stress a number of common set of risks including 
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credit risk, market risk, sovereign risk, securitization risk, cost of funding and interest income 
(EBA 2014) under an assumption of static balance sheet.  
 
The baseline scenario 
The Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) of the European 
Commission produces three Economic forecasts per year (winter, spring and autumn). The 
winter forecast, as published in February 2014 is the base of the EBA stress test baseline 
scenario. Since this forecast covers the period of 2014-2015, year 2016 projections were based 
on technical assumptions derived for the purpose of the exercise. 
The baseline scenario predicts a continuation of the recovery. The economic outlook is 
improving as confidence is improving supported by the new policy measures of the euro zone. 
There are signs of a long lasting recovery after the double-dip recession of 2008. Real GDP 
figures indicate that as they are expected to grow with each year fuelled by the recovery of the 
U.S economy. Labor market is improving too but slowly due to the low net job creation. 
Therefore it stabilizes by year 2015 and then it is expected to decrease. Subdued consumer-
price inflation remains low as a result of the falling prices of commodities and the rising euro 
exchange rate and it is expected to rise gradually as unemployment slowly decreases.  
Table 3 Baseline Scenario 
 2014 2015 2016* 
 EU Euro Area EU Euro Area EU Euro Area 
Real GDP growth 1.5% 1.2% 2.0% 1,8% 1.8% 1.7% 
Unemployment 10.4% 11.7% 10.4% 11.7% 10.1% 11.3% 
Inflation 1.2% 1.0% 1.45% 1.25% 1.5% 1.7% 
Source: European Commission                                                                                                              *technical assumptions 
 
The adverse scenario 
The proposed adverse scenario is an attempt to simulate the financial shocks caused by a 
number of threats in a form of deviations from the baseline scenario. Variables as GDP, 
unemployment, inflation and interest rates will be subject to pressure from (ESRB, 2014):  
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 Increased global bond yields 
 Deterioration of credit quality 
 Stalling policy reforms 
 Lack of bank balance sheet repair 
The adverse scenario describes a chained reaction that starts as investors avoid long-term fixed 
income securities. That sets in motion a general re-pricing and sell-off of assets that lead to a 
rise of US long-term interest rates that soon contaminates the global long-term bond yields. 
Emerging market economies (EMEs) suffer from capital outflows and their exclusion from the 
international capital markets as they perceived to be too risky. EMEs reduce their demand for 
EU imports thus stressing EU GDP growth. 
Additionally, the rise of interest rates and the subsequent global financial tension will affect 
money market and the funding cost of banks. As both short-term interbank rates increase and 
long-term funding follow the rise of government bond yields, banks’ stock prices are expected 
to decline by approximately 19% on average.  
Apart from the financial environment the scenario traces shocks in the real economic 
environment. Decreased domestic demand weakens investment and private consumption 
across EU. Real estate destabilizes and deviates by -14% from the baseline scenario. Banks 
respond by applying stricter credit standards further affecting real economy. 
Table 4 Adverse Scenario 
 2014 2015 2016 
 EU Euro Area EU Euro Area EU Euro Area 
Real GDP growth -0.7% -0.7% -1.5% -1.4% 0.1% 0% 
Unemployment 11.3% 12.3% 12.3% 12.9% 13% 13.5% 
Inflation 1.1 1.0% 0.6% 0.6% 0% 0.3% 
Source: ESRB 
 
Key constraints 
The restrictive methodology was built on a number of constraints that were inserted to 
enhance the comparability, validity and consistency of the results: 
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 Balance sheets remain static and they do not include workout and defaulted assets 
 Banks maintain the same geographical and product strategies  and operations 
 Predefined caps and floors on net interest income 
 prescribed stress impacts depending on risk type  
 
Disclosed Results 
The results were announced in October 2014 and revealed a capital shortfall of EUR 24.6BN as 
24 banks did not pass the adverse scenario’s threshold of 5.5% (Common Equity Tier 1). 16 out 
of the 24 did not pass the 8.8% threshold of the baseline scenario as well. Competent 
authorities are responsible to communicate the actions necessary based on the announced 
results.  
The announcement of the results was greeted with mixed feelings by the market. Apart from 
the financial institutions announcements declaring their success in the exercise, market 
participants expressed their views on the results. Dendrinou (2014) in her article in The Wall 
Street Journal reports such opinions that underline the transparency of the process and the 
unprecedented amount of data offered to investors allowing them to judge for themselves. An 
opposite position is recorded by Treanor (2014) as expressed by Howard Archer, chief UK & 
European Economist IHS Global Insight that suggests that a successful stress test does not 
restore confidence and capital demand from the private sector in the midst of uncertainty. 
Hans-Werner Sinn, president of Munich-based Ifo Institute questions the validity of capital 
shortfall as simulated scenario did not incorporate deflation in Southern Europe (Black, 2014). 
The Economist (2014) points out that banks succeeded in previous exercises failed soon after 
the positive results, therefore it is stating the question of whether markets will really care 
about the results. 
Unlike previous exercises there is limited analysis of the market reaction to the stress test of 
2014 as results were announced less than 4 months ago. This thesis analyses the reaction of the 
market to the stress test exercise as depicted in the stock markets in the form of stock prices 
deviations. 
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4.2. Event Study Results 
 
Table 5 Stressed Banks Results 
STRESSED BANKS 
 Announcement Methodology Results 
Day AAR G AAR G AAR G 
-1 0.0034513 1.253058 -0.003882 -1.84304 0.0044137 1.492179 
0 0.0032686 1.412995 -0.00309 -1.08251   
1 0.0008238 0.148357 0.0029338 1.185103 -0.001287 -0.21955 
       
 CAAR J CAAR J CAAR J 
 0.007544 2.619214** -0.00404 -2.0329* 0.003127 0.819382 
*Significant at the 5 percent level 
**Significant at the 1 percent level 
 
 
Table 6 Not Stressed Banks Results 
NOT STRESSED BANKS 
 Announcement Methodology Results 
Day AAR G AAR G AAR G 
-1 0.001219 0.351026 0.011704 2.283634* 0.000679 0.230862 
0 -0.00511 -1.44361 -0.00679 -1.84031   
1 0.005544 1.006423 0.011686 1.703669 0.01079 3.629623** 
       
 CAAR J CAAR J CAAR J 
 0.001655 0.474154 0.016604 3.360329** 0.011469 4.980895** 
*Significant at the 5 percent level 
**Significant at the 1 percent level 
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Table 7 PIGS Results 
PIGS 
 Announcement Methodology Results 
Day AAR G AAR G AAR G 
-1 0.012694 2.078568* -0.00234 -0.86788 0.016905 3.275658** 
0 0.009237 2.404041* -0.00318 -0.84508   
1 0.009401 1.223552 0.004574 0.892545 -0.02155 -1.64328 
       
 CAAR J CAAR J CAAR J 
 0.031332 7.67971** -0.00095 -0.30764 -0.00427 -0.51032 
*Significant at the 5 percent level 
**Significant at the 1 percent level 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 Failed Banks Results 
FAILED BANKS 
 Announcement Methodology Results 
Day AAR G AAR G AAR G 
-1 0.013815722 1.777253 -0.001146898 -0.22654 0.016138287 3.220901** 
0 0.009650512 1.944004 -0.005859236 -0.90676   
1 -0.004490171 -0.24973 0.014615414 2.436386* -0.02454455 -1.6179 
       
 CAAR J CAAR J CAAR J 
 0.018976 2.2127951* 0.007609 1.5231485 -0.00841 -0.709999 
*Significant at the 5 percent level 
**Significant at the 1 percent level 
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Chapter 5: Interpretation of findings 
The findings of the event study are presented and interpreted in this chapter. The analysis is 
divided in three sections according to the number of events examined. 
In January 2014, when EBA announced the new round of stress test, results indicate a positive 
reaction from the majority of the market. The single exception to this is the negative but 
insignificant average abnormal return of not stressed banks on the day of the announcement. 
This reaction was insignificant (G statistic) but as indicated by the J statistic for the total of the 
tested banks during the 3-day window the null hypothesis that the event has no impact can be 
rejected. This may be due to the confidence of the investors that banks were now better 
equipped to withstand a new round of stress tests building on the past experience and the 
corrective actions implied by the competent authorities. Investors welcomed the new exercise 
as a mean of risk dilution as banking sector opaqueness would be further decreased due to the 
wide sample of participating institutions.  
Soon after the initial announcement, EBA disclosed the methodology and scenarios that would 
be used in the exercise. Bank stock prices were under pressure the day before and the day of 
the announcement and they recorded positive average abnormal returns the next trading day. 
These reactions were insignificant per trading day but significant for the event. An explanation 
of this phenomenon may be the uncertainty of the markets regarding to the severity of the 
adverse scenario and how strict the new stress would be. Another interesting aspect is that not 
stressed banks were significantly and positively affected by this event as their J≈3.36. Data lead 
to the rejection of the null hypothesis as investors may found new exercise difficult to pass and 
showed preference in the stocks of non-stressed banks. Failed banks stock prices increased in 
the trading day that followed the announcement as market lacked the information to judge the 
possible negative (for these banks) outcome of the exercise. 
The final event took place on Sunday 26 October 2014 and as exchange markets are closed on 
Sundays the 2-day window includes Friday 24 and Monday 27 October 2014. As expected 
stressed banks including PIGS and failed institutions recorded negative returns as markets 
opened in Monday following the news that 24 banks, 1 out of five, failed the exercise and 
would be forced to take corrective actions. The negative effect appears to be insignificant in 
contrast to the positive returns of PIGS and failed banks. Investors possibly perceived that the 
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exercise would not fail a greater number of institutions than previous years, given the 
restructuring of banks’ balance sheets. Another explanation of this behavior may be the so 
called “weekend effect” that explains higher returns on Fridays in contrast to lower returns on 
Mondays as a result of short selling techniques or even pure investors’ optimism in anticipation 
of the weekend.  
 
Chapter 6: Conclusion 
This chapter offers a conclusion of the results of the research, a presentation of constraints and 
suggestions for further research. 
In an environment of stricter banking supervision, EU responded on the standards of Basel III 
and its own regulations and directives in order to restore confidence and ensure the 
continuation of the recovery through a resilient to shocks banking sector. Stress tests 
spearheaded this effort since 2009, when they were first introduced by CEBS in a form of a tool 
useful for policy makers as results were confidential. Criticism and the opaque nature of the 
banking sector led EU, through EBA, into introducing stricter scenarios, increased transparency 
and wider samples with every new exercise. 
This thesis traced the evolution of stress tests from a method useful only to policy makers to a 
source of invaluable information for market participants including investors. As recorded in 
papers assessing the impact of stress tests to the market performance, investors’ reactions 
varied with every stress test. Insignificant market reactions of 2010 were followed by significant 
abnormal returns and increased volatility in 2011. I focused on the latest exercise of 2014 and 
through an event study analysis attempted to answer the same question present in studies 
before. Whether stress tests affect stock market performance and thus disclose information 
investors and markets did not have before. 
I find evidence of significant positive abnormal returns in the event window surrounding the 
announcement of the exercise that can be linked with the theory behind bank opaqueness and 
how investors welcome any measure that aims to increase transparency into banking 
institutions. It is interesting how PIGS banks stocks are among the most benefited of this event 
as market perceives this test a step before the recapitalization of less resilient banks of the 
Europe’s south. The announcement of the methodology troubled markets as indicated by the 
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combination of negative and positive returns.  Investors were cautious the day before the 
actual announcement while stocks returned to positive figures two days after. Again the 
analysis is indicating significant abnormal returns in the sample of failed banks and the null 
hypothesis of no effect is strongly rejected for the banks that did not participate in the exercise. 
Finally, the announcement of the results in October 2014 significantly affected the stock prices 
of three out of four sample groups strongly rejecting the null hypothesis in most cases and 
clearly indicating that investors did not have this information and they were forced to revise 
their estimations. The results above indicate that stress tests affect the prices of bank stocks as 
investors perceive value in the information disclosed, information that was previously only 
available to supervisors.    
6.1 Constraints 
This thesis used two different methodologies and subsequently inherited their limitations. The 
research I performed in the available literature was constraint due to the huge amount of 
available sources and the limited time I had to invest into filtering relevant material. 
Furthermore the statistical analysis I have conducted is built on a certain assumptions made 
based on relevant literature and used by similar papers.  
6.2 Further Research 
Stress tests may have evolved in time but still come with shortcomings. EBA has attempted to 
answer to criticism by using stricter scenarios and wider samples but there is still room for 
improvements. The results of the exercises depend on the quality of the data provided by the 
stressed institutions and in this direction EBA delegated the quality control to competent 
authorities.  
I think that the value of a combination of bottom-up and top-down stress tests could be a 
subject of further investigation. This hybrid stress test could allow supervisors to cross check 
results and analyze possible discrepancies. This kind of exercises have already been used in the 
assessment of the financial system in Cyprus and by the Austrian Authorities. Can EU 
authorities use such an combined exercise to deal with the disadvantages of bottom-up stress 
testing? Would the cost and complexity of such an exercise undermine the effectiveness of the 
test? 
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Chapter 8: Appendices 
 
Table 1. Abnormal Returns of tested banks. 
 1st Event-Announcement 2nd Event-Methodology 3rd Event-Results 
Erste Group -0.016 -0.008 0.006 0.002 0.010 -0.001 0.025 0.057 
Raif. Z. 
Österreich 
-0.008 0.001 0.013 -0.009 0.013 -0.005 0.034 0.036 
 Volksbanken  0.005 -0.001 0.002 0.063 0.009 0.000 0.004 -0.003 
Dexia NV 0.001 -0.001 -0.228 -0.025 0.004 0.023 -0.036 0.033 
Danske Bank 0.004 0.002 0.007 -0.006 0.012 -0.008 -0.009 0.011 
KBC Group NV 0.000 -0.008 -0.002 -0.004 -0.019 0.012 0.012 -0.007 
Bank of Cyprus  0.000 0.002 0.006 0.001 -0.003 0.002 0.000 0.004 
Hellenic Bank 
Public  
0.016 -0.009 0.014 0.004 -0.074 0.020 -0.014 -0.005 
Aareal Bank  0.011 -0.013 -0.011 -0.002 0.014 -0.013 -0.010 0.011 
Commerzbank  -0.011 -0.024 -0.029 -0.004 0.026 -0.021 0.008 0.012 
Deutsche Bank  0.012 -0.028 0.005 -0.001 0.008 -0.006 -0.005 -0.001 
IKB  -0.018 0.029 -0.009 -0.024 0.018 -0.023 0.009 -0.047 
Landeskreditbank  0.005 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 
Jyske Bank -0.008 0.031 0.081 -0.002 -0.061 -0.021 -0.017 0.080 
Sydbank 0.005 0.024 0.042 0.006 -0.063 -0.005 -0.051 0.033 
Banco Bilbao 
Vizcaya 
Argentaria 
0.004 0.009 -0.003 0.000 -0.008 -0.003 0.003 0.002 
Banco de 
Sabadell 
-0.003 0.021 0.008 -0.007 0.008 0.005 0.013 -0.011 
Banco Popular 
Español 
0.035 -0.014 0.006 -0.012 0.004 -0.030 0.009 0.025 
Banco Santander 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.012 -0.008 0.010 -0.003 -0.004 
Bankinter 0.019 0.004 0.016 -0.019 0.001 -0.005 -0.010 0.014 
Liberbank -0.016 0.013 -0.022 -0.005 -0.004 0.001 0.001 -0.025 
BNP Paribas -0.001 -0.008 0.001 0.001 -0.010 -0.025 0.001 0.008 
Groupe Crédit 
Agricole 
0.000 -0.007 0.003 -0.004 -0.013 -0.002 0.005 0.012 
Société Générale -0.014 -0.012 0.012 0.001 0.012 0.003 0.000 -0.002 
Alpha Bank 0.028 0.041 0.054 -0.024 -0.010 0.042 0.015 -0.023 
Eurobank 
Ergasias 
0.113 -0.005 0.071 -0.015 0.048 0.066 0.043 0.025 
National Bank of 
Greece 
0.040 -0.005 0.085 -0.032 -0.036 -0.015 0.006 -0.051 
Piraeus Bank 0.037 0.049 0.096 -0.007 -0.035 0.039 0.035 0.036 
OTP Bank Ltd 0.006 0.010 0.000 0.015 0.003 -0.002 -0.002 0.012 
Allied Irish Banks 
plc 
-0.005 -0.023 0.009 -0.042 -0.021 -0.025 -0.047 0.005 
Permanent tsb 
plc. 
-0.030 0.041 -0.089 -0.011 0.005 0.041 -0.027 -0.003 
Bank of Ireland -0.030 -0.014 0.013 -0.016 0.021 0.019 -0.006 -0.007 
Banca Carige 
S.P.A.  
-0.003 0.003 0.005 0.003 -0.015 0.024 0.038 -0.171 
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Monte dei Paschi  0.004 0.015 0.008 0.004 -0.010 -0.032 0.099 -0.222 
Banca Piccolo 0.019 0.035 -0.029 0.005 -0.007 0.020 0.052 0.038 
Banco Popolare -0.017 0.011 -0.034 0.004 0.001 -0.019 0.010 -0.017 
Popolare Di 
Milano  
-0.006 0.005 -0.014 0.014 0.030 0.013 0.012 -0.025 
Popolare Di 
Sondrio 
0.000 -0.005 0.000 -0.008 -0.008 0.009 0.017 -0.020 
 Società 
Cooperativa 
0.035 0.013 -0.034 -0.003 -0.001 0.000 0.015 0.009 
Intesa Sanpaolo  -0.004 0.033 0.005 0.006 -0.002 0.001 0.010 -0.008 
UniCredit S.p.A. -0.014 0.009 -0.004 0.005 -0.011 -0.010 -0.002 -0.001 
Unione Di Banche 0.014 0.000 -0.019 0.020 0.001 -0.004 0.003 -0.031 
Bank of Valletta 
plc 
-0.007 -0.001 -0.006 -0.045 -0.008 0.008 0.000 -0.001 
ING Bank N.V. -0.007 -0.011 0.009 0.004 -0.006 0.022 -0.008 0.003 
DNB Bank Group 0.009 -0.024 0.018 0.002 -0.004 0.015 0.003 0.027 
BANK BPH SA 0.004 0.008 -0.010 -0.016 -0.001 -0.023 0.016 -0.017 
GETIN NOBLE 
BANK SA 
-0.029 0.027 0.003 0.014 0.044 0.029 0.036 0.067 
ALIOR BANK SA 0.003 0.008 0.003 -0.017 0.003 -0.001 -0.003 0.006 
Banco BPI -0.006 -0.013 -0.014 -0.014 -0.012 -0.010 0.004 0.041 
Banco Comercial  -0.008 -0.025 0.012 0.008 0.003 0.016 0.004 -0.021 
Nordea Bank AB 0.000 -0.002 0.011 -0.014 0.021 0.004 -0.006 0.008 
 Handelsbanken 0.002 -0.008 0.004 -0.008 0.010 0.001 -0.005 0.012 
Swedbank AB 
(publ) 
0.003 0.000 0.004 -0.005 0.001 0.009 -0.002 0.015 
Barclays plc -0.003 -0.003 0.001 0.003 -0.015 0.015 -0.001 -0.001 
HSBC Holdings 
plc 
0.004 -0.001 0.009 -0.001 0.004 -0.006 -0.005 0.000 
Lloyds Banking 0.012 0.000 -0.019 -0.012 -0.008 0.011 0.000 -0.004 
RBS 0.013 -0.015 0.009 -0.024 -0.004 0.000 -0.013 0.006 
Bank Handlowy -0.001 0.029 -0.028 0.018 -0.034 0.005 -0.002 0.004 
 
 
Table 2. Abnormal Returns of not-tested banks 
 1st Event - Announcement 2nd Event- Methodology 3rd Event- Results 
Komercni Banka 0.0006 0.0151 0.0012 -0.0090 0.0099 -0.0068 -0.0059 0.0102 
Mbank 0.0129 0.0165 -0.0009 -0.0115 -0.0148 -0.0298 0.0000 0.0138 
Sberbank  -0.0063 -0.0052 0.0144 0.0501 -0.0202 0.0008 0.0108 0.0207 
VTB Bank -0.0012 0.0037 -0.0085 0.0283 0.0170 0.0043 -0.0009 0.0355 
Mosobl Bank -0.0053 0.0019 0.0033 0.0052 -0.0033 0.0008 -0.0004 0.0011 
Bankia 0.0092 0.0091 0.0543 -0.0048 0.0001 0.0317 0.0301 0.0227 
Credit Suisse  -0.0113 -0.0007 0.0029 0.0047 -0.0013 0.0039 -0.0030 0.0072 
Julius Bar  -0.0048 -0.0082 -0.0431 0.0069 -0.0095 0.0122 -0.0035 0.0115 
Garanti Bankasi 0.0219 -0.0227 -0.0017 0.0282 -0.0251 0.0498 -0.0077 0.0110 
Is Bankasi 0.0085 -0.0233 0.0201 0.0233 -0.0205 0.0169 -0.0135 0.0108 
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Yapi Ve Kredi 0.0080 -0.0154 0.0057 0.0341 -0.0204 0.0444 -0.0049 0.0030 
Halk Bankasi 0.0208 -0.0204 0.0165 0.0217 -0.0205 0.0580 -0.0075 0.0151 
Stand.Chartered -0.0233 -0.0107 0.0112 -0.0061 0.0029 -0.0115 0.0129 -0.0030 
Natixis -0.0125 -0.0111 0.0021 -0.0071 0.0105 -0.0110 0.0031 -0.0084 
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Business Project Proposal  
 
Draft Title  
EU-wide stress test 2014. 
An analysis of the methodology, results and criticism. 
 
Background 
Banking institutions, throughout the ongoing financial crisis, remain in the limelight, as their 
role in the occurrence, transmitting and solving of financial crises is a deciding one (Adnrieş, 
2014). Their credibility and resilience were tested by adverse market conditions and now the 
European banking sector is trying to recover. 
The European Banking Authority (EBA) designed stress tests to serve as a common foundation 
on which national authorities can base their assessment of banks (EBA, 2014). This comes as a 
part of the attempt to strengthen market discipline and increase transparency. 
On 31st January 2014 EBA announced the key components of the forthcoming EU-wide stress 
test among the euro zone’s 128 most important lenders. This will be the fourth round of stress 
tests since 2009 and it will implement a consistent and comparable methodology allowing 
rigorous assessment of banks under stress. 
The results will be disclosed in the second half of October and the European Central Bank (ECB) 
plans to publish an unprecedented trove of data on individual banks. For example, results will 
include the 'leverage ratio', a blunt measure of banks' total assets to equity that lenders are not 
yet required to disclose (Noonan, 2014). 
Although, this effort raised a number of complaints and criticism in the past based on 
accusations of loss assumptions and inadequacy from angered analysts. It is only a matter of 
time to discover the market’s reaction to this year’s results. 
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Initial Review of the Literature and Key References 
The analysis will be based on relevant literature in the following subjects: 
- Financial Stress Tests 
- Basel Accords 
- European Central Bank supervisory 
- European Banking Authority stress tests 
- National Central Banks 
References will also include announcements published by EBA, ECB and central banks, articles 
and reports. 
 
Research Questions 
This dissertation’s aim is to answer the following questions: 
- Why we need to stress test European banks? 
- How banks’ resilience to adverse scenarios will be tested? 
- What are the results of 2014? 
- What the outcomes of this stress test and how are they comparing to previous results? 
- Is there room to doubt results and on what ground? 
 
Research Design 
First, the theory behind the stress test will be illustrated in addition to an analysis of the 
current global economy environment that forced supervisors to test banking institutions.  
Then, the methodology in practice behind this exercise will be presented in appropriate detail, 
in order to allow to fully understand how analysts produced such results. 
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The actual results of 2014 will be presented through a graphic comparison to previous years’ 
that will lead to an integrated analysis of their impact. 
Finally, we will discuss the disadvantages of the exercise on the basis of the remarks made by 
market experts. 
 
Contribution (and Expected Outcomes) 
The goal of this dissertation is to deconstruct a term that became a part of our everyday life 
and then provide an in depth analysis that will act as a guide for market participants as 
investors and depositors in their struggle to choose between institutions in search for safety. 
Additionally, it will offer a historical analysis of the results of stress tests from 2009 to 2014 that 
will illustrate European banking sector’s reaction to financial crisis and its level resilience. 
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